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Torts: The Quest for Appropriate
Standards
Harry Kalven, Jr.*
Though the quest for appropriate standards centers around constitutional law cases, where judiciallatitude is broadest, the problem inheres
in all cases whose novelty or whose fortuitous entry into an area of
disintegrating precedent affords a comparable latitude. Given the accelerating birthrate of extraordinary novelties, we must achieve some
accelerationin the death rate of antiques.t

T

HERE IS, I think, a fundamental mystery about evaluation of a

judge's performance. Does the judicial function leave enough freedom to the actor so that we can discern distinctive performances? Or is
the good judge, by definition, one whose performance is not individualized? I really do not understand what guides judgment in these matters, but my puzzlement does not inhibit my enthusiasm for making
judgments about judges. This much at least is clear. We admire judges
who can rework and restate old law and we admire judges who can
creatively change law just the right amount. In any event, whatever are
the criteria, Chief Justice Roger Traynor is an interesting case in point;
indeed he offers an ideal case for exploring the theme of conservatism
and creativity in judging.
In his first twenty-five years on the bench, Chief Justice Traynor
has written some one-hundred opinions in tort cases. The result is an
impressive body of work which not surprisingly has touched virtually
all bases. He has given us nothing less than his own personal casebook
in torts.'
Roger Traynor is a law professor's judge.' His opinions are concise;
he raises all the issues; his writing is lucid and to the point. His citations
* A.B. 1935, J.D. 1938, University of Chicago. Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

t Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It
This is perhaps the place to note that in
of his cases: Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481,
Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); State Rubbish
1

Justice, 49 CAra. L. Rav. 615, 625 (1961).
our personal casebook on torts we use eight
275 P.2d 15 (1954) ; Richards v. Stanley, 43
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,

240 P.2d 282 (1952); Satterlee v. Orange Glen School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279
(1947); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(concurring opinion); Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943); Seeger
v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P.2d 977 (1941); Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33,
112 P.2d 631 (1941). See GREGORY & KALvEN, CASES AND MATERAils oN ToRTs 1119, 148,
857, 156, 647, 146, 1247 (1959). And after reading his full torts corpus, it is apparent that
we would have been well advised to have used more.
2 See, e.g., Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BuFFALO L. Razv. 1, 13 (1951): "We
professors prefer Judge Traynor's clear, analytic approach."
HeinOnline -- 53 Cal L. Rev. 189 1965

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 189

are knowledgeable, economical, and literate-he has, I think, the best
taste in legal citatio -ff
.n any contemporary judge. The style is his own;
it is different in torts, for example, from that of Frank, Clark, Hand,
Magruder, Holmes, or Cardozo. It is official and impersonal in tone; he
is not a phrase-maker, a coiner of epigrams. He is not ironic, as Hand so
often is, as he gives his public reasons. He does not share his difficulties
with us, as he decides c'aies, howe ei thoughtfully introspective he can
be about the judicial process on other occasions."
Since his concurring opinion in Escola4 in 1944 attracted nation-wide
attention and since a year or two ago in Yuba Power' he was able to
bring California products liability law into line with that opinion, there
.is the danger of taking this single daring act of judicial creativity as
the full measure of Traynor as a judge. A reading, however, of his lifework in torts shows'.strong strains of conservatism, of non-rebellion
against, current tort law,' and makes the departure in Escola and
YuaPower all the more arresting. Accordingly, we shall begin in the
less obvious corner and come to Escola and Yuba Power by way of conclusion.
I
His approach is serious and businesslike. He is not at all selfindulgent; A case in point is Wiseman v. Industrial Accident Commission6 where the temptations placed before judicial decorum were considerable. The widow and children of decedent, a commercial traveller
-who was burned to*death in a fire in his hotel room in the early morning,
seekl d6mpensation. The complication is that the decedent was found
with; "a woman not his wife," and there was evidence of drinking, The
Comfmission deniedi an award because of the immoral purposes. Justice
Traynor reverses. What is of special interest is not the result, which
might today be "rdached ini most jurisdictions, but the sobriety and tact
:
.I
with,4hich he gets to it.
Whether or not the employee was occupying the room for an
'immoral and unlawful purpose of his own, he was also occupying it as
a necessary incident of his employment which required him to be away
frbni home .... The fact that the employee had a guest in his room
while he was off duty in no way detracted from the fact that he was
'also there on his employer's business, and since the employee's fault
" See, eg., Traynor, Better Days in Court for a New Day's Problems, 17

109.,(1963).

VAxD.

L. REV.

4
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(concurring opinion).
5 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
d46 Cal. 2d 570, 297 P.2d 649 (1956).
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is irrelevant if the requirements of the law are met, it is immaterial
that the employee's personal purpose in having a guest in his room was
immoral and unlawful. 7
A hallmark of his judging is a patient craftsmanlike working out of
things within the frame of reference he has been given by the existing
law. One illustration will have to suffice.8 In Benton v. Sloss9 we see him
working with care and elegance on what might be called a routine, if
complex, case. Jay, a minor, has attempted to buy a second-hand car
from the defendant. His father refuses to sign the contract and tells
him to take the car back. Because it is a week-end, Jay is unable to return
the car immediately. After a second futile effort to return it, he picks up
some friends and goes for a ride in the country. While engaged in racing
another car, he crashes due in part to his speed, his inexperience as a
driver, and defective brakes. The plaintiffs are the passengers in the Jay
car. The defendant car dealer appeals from a judgment against him, and
the court in an opinion by Traynor affirms. The trial court had found
that Jay was guilty of wilful misconduct in his driving. California has
an owner consent statute imposing vicarious liability on owners whose
cars are driven with their implied permission; there is also the customary
guest statute exonerating the driver and those responsible for him from
liability except for wilful misconduct. Following earlier precedent, Traynor quickly disposes of the owner consent statute as a basis for liability;
the statute is limited to vicarious liability for negligence; hence Jay's
wilful misconduct falls outside it. The defendant is not liable vicariously,
therefore, unless there is an explicit agency relationship, which, no one
asserts.
The owner consent statute aside, the question then is whether the
defendant is liable for his own negligence in selling a defective car.
Traynor agrees that "a used car dealer does not insure the safety of a
car he sells and is under no duty to disassemble the car to examine its
parts."'10 Yet he has a duty of reasonable inspection; there is sufficient
evidence to support the jury judgment that there was not a proper inspection of the brakes.
The defendant still has three strong points to make: First, given
Jay's reckless driving, the defect in the brakes was not a cause in fact
of the accident; second, there is no proximate cause because defendant
lId. at 573, 297 P.2d at 651.
Two other very good examples of this trait are Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654,
660, 150 P.2d 876, 879 (1944) (concurring opinion), and Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200,
217, 148 P.2d 633, 643 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
938 Cal. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952).
10 Id. at 404, 240 P.2d at 578.
8
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is not liable for the intervening reckless driving of Jay; third, he is
relieved of liability by the auto guest statute whch limits liability to
wilful misconduct. Traynor finds that the defective brakes conjoined
with Jay's reckless driving sufficiently to make cause in fact a jury question. He decides further, in full command of modern niceties of proximate cause doctrine, that the risk that the brakes would be called upon
in an emergency created by the driver's negligence was one of the
hazards that defendant could reasonably foresee and was one of the
bases for holding him negligent in the first place. Finally, as simply a
straight reading of the statutory language, Justice Traynor will not extend
the bar of the auto guest statute to the defendant. The defendant is not
the driver of the car nor is he "legally responsible for the conduct of
such driver." Justice Traynor is not interested in any anomaly that may,
as defendant urges, result if only the accidental circumstance that he
was not driving his car at the time exposes the defendant to liability. "He
would bring himself within the section by construing 'driver' to include
'owner' but the section does not admit of that construction."'" Any
anomaly presumably is in the guest statute itself. The auto guest is not
an outcast; he retains, of course, his full remedies against third parties
and here the owner of this car is as much a third party as would be the
driver of another car.
The result is reached not only lucidly but it is reached tranquilly.
There is no talk of the function of owner consent statutes in the quest
for solvent defendants; ' there is no talk of strict liability for used car
dealers; there is no philosophical bemusement at how complex the incidence of liability is for an accident of this sort. There is simply a professional utilization of the law already there to reach the desired result.
Another key Traynor trait is the firming up and cleaning up of a
sloppy area of law. A fine illustration is furnished by one of his earliest
tort opinions, Imperial Ice Company v. Rossier' decided in 1941. Plaintiffs had sued defendants for inducing the breach of a contract not to
compete in the sale of ice. The trial court sustained a demurrer on the
theory that under California law there was no liability for inducing
breach of contract by means that were not "otherwise unlawful." The
supreme court reverses. In a concise powerful opinion Justice Traynor
structures the law on interference with contract relations. The clarity
and precision of formulation could scarcely be improved upon as he
moves from proposition to proposition.
All jurisdictions recognize the tort when the means are independently
11

Ibid.

12 See G, oRY & KALvEx,

CASES AND MATmEmAs o

ToRmS 627 (1959); SHULmAN &

TORTS 654 (1952).
13 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).

JAmES, CASES AND MATERuis Ox
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tortious; most jurisdictions also find a tort "for inducing a breach of
contract by the use of moral, social or economic pressures, in
themselves lawful unless there is sufficient justification for such inducement.' 4 Justification exists whenever 'a person induces a breach of
contract to protect an interest that has greater social value than insuring
the stability of contract."' 15 Examples are cited of the interest "in health,
safety, and morals," and of the interest of labor in "improving working
conditions." But it is clear that it is no justification "simply because
[one] is in competition with one of the parties to the contract and seeks
to further his own economic advantage."' 6 Here the values of contract
stability outweigh the values of free competition. But absent a contract,
competitive freedom is "of sufficient importance to justify one competitor in inducing a third person to forsake another competitor."'
Further, a person is allowed to operate his business by advertising, reducing prices, or other similar means, even though some third parties
may be induced thereby to break contracts with competitors in order to
deal with him. What is prohibited 8 is the "intentional" injury, brought
about "actively and affirmatively.'
There remains then the California precedent in Boyson v. Thorn.19
The case had been read as holding that there was no tort if the means
were otherwise lawful. Traynor carefully re-examines the decision and
decides that all the court had meant to say was that there was justification under the circumstances, and not that every time otherwise lawful
means are used there is justification. "The statements to the effect that
no interference with contractual relations is actionable if the means employed are otherwise lawful were not necessary to the decision and
should be disregarded. 20 Finally, turning to the pleadings in the case before him, he finds enough allegations of intentional and active inducing
of breach to state a cause of action.
Chief Justice Traynor's judicial style is characterized too by his
maturity with respect to legal formulas. He is not to be trapped by flatfooted repetition of them. And some of his most helpful opinions show
a restating of formula in terms of purpose so as to21save the result. Two
fraud cases may be selected for brief illustrations. In Seeger v. Ode 122
14Id. at 35, 112 P.2d at 632.
15 Ibid.
16 Id. at 36, 112 P.2d at 633.

17Ibid.
18d. at 37, 112 P.2d 633.
10 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492 (1893).
2
OImperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 38, 112 P.2d 631, 634 (1941).
21
See also his handling of the "exclusive control" requirement of res ipsa loquitur in
Rose v. Melody-Lane, 39 Cal. 2d 481, 486, 247 P.2d 335, 338 (1952).
22 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P.2d 977 (1941).
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he escapes the pitfalls of the maxim that a man must be taken to know
the state of his own title; the question is always one of reasonable reliance. At least, under the special facts of that case there can be actionable fraud where the defendant has misrepresented to the plaintiff the state
of the plaintiff's title. There is no place in the law of fraud for such a
conclusive presumption about what the victim knows, and, to the extent
that there is prior authority to the contrary, it is overruled. In Gagne v.
Bertran23 he handles easily the formula that there can be no recovery
for misrepresentations of opinion. In that case the defendant was a test
driller and it was precisely his expert opinion that plaintiff was buying
and on which he was entitled accordingly to rely.
II
The examples used thus far have served to mark certain easily identifiable qualities of Traynor as a judge. To catch the full flavor of his
judgment, however, requires that we now shift to paired comparisons
of certain cases which would roughly appear to involve the same problems or values and watch how carefully and firmly Justice Traynor
discriminates between them.
The first comparison is furnished by State Rubbish Collectors v.
24 -and Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines2 In a sense both
Siliznoff
cases involve legal recognition of emotional harm. In Seffert Justice
Traynor files a vigorous dissent against affirming an award for 187,000
dollars of which 134,000 dollars was chargeable to pain and suffering.
In'Siliznoff he deliberately extends California law to recognize as a tort
the intentional infliction of serious emotional harm without physical
harm.
His stance toward emotional harm as a compensable damage is
markedly different in the two contexts. In Seffert he first reviews at some
length the current criticism of the award for pain and suffering,2" finds it
especially "anomalous" under contemporary loss shifting theories of
tort damages, and concludes that at best it serves "to ease plaintiff's
2343 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954).

2438 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
25 56 Cal. 2d 498, 509, 364 P.2d 337, 344, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (1961)

(dissent-

ing opinion).
26 See, e.g., Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of lusurance, 18 LAW
& COMa. PROB. 219 (1953); Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OMo ST.
LJ.200 (1958); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 476 (1959).
But compare Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the PersonalInjury Damage Award, 19 Ono
ST. LJ. 158 (1958); Blum and Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 Uuv. Cmi. L. REv. 641, 672-74 (1964).
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discomfort and to pay for attorney fees for which plaintiffs are otherwise not compensated.127 But this is a rule of law too well settled for the
court to alter; "any change in this regard must await reexamination by
the legislature."'2 He then finds that the particular award was excessive
when compared to other cases and that the excess wasidue to the prejudicial argument of counsel in using a variant of the per diem rhetoric
on pain and suffering-he had asked for 2,000 dollars per year for the
remainder of plaintiff's life.
In Siliznoff the defendant is sued on notes given in purchase of a
garbage collection route. Garbage collection appears to be in the hands
of a racketeering union, and defendant claims the notes were secured by
duress, and he counterclaims for an assault. He is awarded compensatory
and punitive damages and the supreme court affirms. There is evidence
that plaintiffs threatened defendant with a physical beating and with
cutting his tires and other violence. On appeal the plaintiffs argue the
familiar rule that future threats cannot be an assault. Traynor decides
to move to a full blown tort for the intentional causing of serious emotional disturbance. He has precedent allowing recovery where the
emotional disturbance has resulted in physical harm; the novelty of
Siliznoff is that he explicity states a rule that will cover cases in which
there is only serious emotional harm. Traynor makes the expansion of
liability through a careful use of the Restatement, thus giving it a non
innovative look. He capitalizes on a well known change in the Restatem ent position on emotional harm between 1934 and 1 9 4 8 .29 Having
made the reform on the authority of the Restatement, Justice Traynor
then deals briefly with the policy arguments and makes a neat point
about the arbitrariness of requiring physical illness as a mark of authenticity: "The jury is ordinarily in a better position however to determine
whether outrageous conduct results in mental distress than whether that
distress in turn results in physical injury." 0 Apart from his heavy reliance on the Restatement there are two other points of note. First, he
does not attempt to restate the traditional law of assault so, as to include
27 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511, 364 P.2d 337, 345, 15 Cal,
Rptr. 161, 169 (1961).
28 Ibid.
20

In 1934 the original RESTATEMimT, TORTS §'46 provided that the intentional causing

of emotional disturbance alone "does not subject the actor to liability." In 1948, § 46 was
amended to read: "One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emo-

tional distress ... ." Id. § 612 (Supp. 1948). There has been a good deal of law journal
commentary on the issue. See, e.g., GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
848-60 (1959) (c. "Is There a Generic 'New Tort' Emerging?").
2o State Rubbish Collectors As'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286
(1952).

HeinOnline -- 53 Cal L. Rev. 195 1965

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 189

serious future threats. And second, although there was evidence of physical illness in this case, he does not rely on it to establish sufficient physical illness to permit recovery within existing California precedents.
The difference between the situations is clear. Chief Justice Traynor
is too sound a judge to have either a monolithic hostility toward or a
monolithic enthusiasm for damages for emotional harm. Such damages
are treacherous to measure, but their function is arguably quite different
depending on whether liability is for intentional or negligent conduct. In
the one case the indignity is deliberate and the damages are essentially
punitive; in the other case the indignity is inadvertent and the problem is
one of devising a feasible widespread compensation system. As he says of
such damages in Seffert: "They become increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in, a mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly
distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods or of transportation."'" Further in Siliznoff he is willing without legislation to
make a modest change in the law because it is modest and because he
can do so as a partner, so to speak, of the Restatement; in Seffert he is
not willing to make what would be a major change in the law, but
defers to the legislature and rests with correcting the evil in the particular case.
Two libel cases, Werner v. Southern California Newspapers8" and
McLeod v. Tribune Publishing Company,3 provide another useful study
of contrasts and highlight Justice Traynor's sense of the judicial role in
different contexts. In Werner the issue is the constitutionality of the
California retraction statute which limits a plaintiff to special damages
in a libel action against radio stations and newspapers unless he has
first requested and has failed to receive a retraction or correction. 4 In upholding the constitutionality Chief Justice Traynor reviews with sympathy
various criticisms of the law of libel. He concludes that the arbitrariness of
the distinction between libel and slander, and consequently between the occasions where general damages are or are not permitted, and the dangers
of excessive recoveries under general damages where in fact there has been
no injury are sufficient considerations to provide a basis for reasonable
legislative judgment restricting the cause of action for libel. Further, the
tendency of the law of libel to inhibit the free flow of communication is a
factor to which the legislature may properly give weight.
In McLeod, decided some nine years later, the question is one of
1

Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511, 364 P.2d 337, 345, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 169 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
3235 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950).
3 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959).
34 See generally Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. R v.

36 (1937). Compare MoRms, ToRTs 297 (1953), criticizing the California statute.
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applying California's "innocent interpretation" rule. Prior cases seem
to suggest that if the statement in question were susceptible to an innocent interpretation, the plaintiff was limited to special damages. Justice
Traynor thus had at hand a judicially created doctrine which as in.
Werner tended to limit libel actions, except in rare cases, to special
damages. This time, however, he reinterprets the rule so as to restrict
it to statements innocent on their face where extrinsic facts are needed
to make them defamatory." The result is to weaken the libel per se
limitation and accordingly to broaden the base of libel actions. Justice
Traynor is moved by a construction of the California Code which defines
"a libel on its face" and by a distaste for "the hair splitting analysis of
language" that would be invited by the broader rule. "It would be a reproach to the law to hold that a defendant intent on destroying the
reputation of a political opponent by falsely labelling him a Communist
or communist sympathizer could achieve his purpose without liability
by casting his defamatory language in the form of an insinuation that
left room for an unintended innocent meaning.""8 California is thus saved
from a resurgence of the idiocies of the doctrine of mitior sensus 3
Justice Traynor in this instance then is adamant about liberalizing the
law of libel even though it requires that earlier cases inconsistent with
the conclusion be "disapproved."
Once again it would be a gross oversimplification of the problem
for him to be either all in favor of the law of libel or all against it. To begin with, the device for limiting the action, employed by the legislature
in Werner, makes some sense; it substitutes, in effect, retraction for
general damages. The device created by the courts in McLeod makes
little sense; it invites manipulation of ambiguity by defamers. Perhaps
the law of libel should be curtailed, but not all means of doing so are
equally attractive. Moreover, the role of the judge is quite different in the
two cases; in Werner he simply must find enough criticism of the law of
libel to support legislative reasonableness. In McLeod he must translate
that criticism into action.
Two routine negligence cases, Neel v. Mannings, Inc."8 and Brandenburg v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 9 offer one more set for comparison.
In the first case the plaintiff, a business invitee, injured her head on a
projection on the ceiling bordering the stairwell in defendant's restaurant.
A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed and a jury verdict for
3
5 See GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERiALS ON TORTS 974-80 (1959).
36 Burdette v. Rollefson Const. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 551, 343 P.2d 36, 44 (1959).
87 The definitive treatment is BoWER, A CODE op THE LAW Op ACTiONABLE DEFAWATION

332-35 (1908).

38 19 Cal. 2d 647, 122 P.2d 576 (1942).
SO 28 Cal. 2d 282, 169 P.2d 909 (1946).
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the plaintiff reinstated with Justice Traynor filing a short pungent dissent.
He argues that defendant is not an insurer and that there is no evidence
of negligence in the construction or maintenance of the stairway. Moreover, the condition itself gave fair warning. "If the danger is so apparent
that the visitor can reasonably be expected to notice it and protect himself, the condition itself constitutes adequate warning and the possessor
is under no obligation to take further action."40
In Brandenburg the fair warning point is again the issue, and the
trial court again grants defendant's motion for judgment notwithstandIng the verdict. This time, however, Traynor writes for the unanimous
court in reversing. Plaintiff, while standing in a safety zone after getting
off a streetcar, is injured by the rear end of the streetcar as it swings
around the curve. Defendants argue that the swing of a streetcar is so
well known "to every adult person" that there is no legal duty to warn.
Arguably the hazard is as obvious here as it was in Neel. For Traynor,
however, the decisive circumstance is that plaintiff was in the safety
zone and that defendant knew where he was standing. "The actor's
duties vary according to whether he may reasonably expect another to
be aware of danger or must know that another's sense of security has
been relaxed .... In the present case it should have been apparent to
defendants that users of the safety zone would relax their vigilance."4'
'The plaintiffs need not think that the overswing would enter the safety
zone; therefore this time plaintiffs were entitled to warning and defendant
is liable.
III
These last two cases point to a major characteristic of Roger Traynor's response to the law of torts, namely, an affinity for the niceties of
negligence analysis. In general he gives the impression that he finds the
negligence concept intelligible and viable, and he handles it in a series
of cases with skill and with a distinctive emphasis. He is clear and rather
insistent that to set the standard of care, whether it is done by court or
42
jury, is to make law, and in his concurring opinion in Toschi v. Christian
he makes a classic statement of this theory. In Mosley v. Arden Farms
Co. 43 he makes an equally clear statement of the modern theory of proximate cause where again "it should be recognized that the issue presented
is one of law" but where, nevertheless, the jury has a key role.
Since these issues are issues of law, Traynor shows something of
40 19
4128
42 24
43 26

Cal.
Cal.
Cal.
Cal.

2d 647,
2d 282,
2d 354,
2d 213,

658, 122 P.2d 576, 582 (1942).
285-86, 167 P.2d 909, 911 (1946).
364, 149 P.2d 848, 854 (1944) (separate opinion).
157 P.2d 372 (1945).
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Holmes' desire to recapture part of this area for the court.44 In Startup
v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 5 where there is a curious echo of Holmes
ill-fated opinion in the Goodman4 6 case, the court reverses a directed
verdict and would leave to the jury the issue of plaintiff's care in crossing
railroad tracks in reliance on wigwag signals. Traynor, concurring, would
go farther and hold plaintiff was careful as a matter of law. "A jury
is in no better position than this court to answer this question. There
is every reason why this issue often raised in practice, should be settled
by this court and not left to the oscillating verdicts of juries. The court
therefore should determine the standard of reasonable conduct for
47
deciding whether or not the conduct in question was negligent.1
This same emphasis is behind his often expressed view that the
violation of criminal statutes should be negligence per se. He first announces his view in opposition to the court in Satterlee v. Orange Glen
School District" in 1947 where he provides another splendid statement of
theory, this time the theory on which a criminal statute, which by its
terms does not cover a civil case, is nevertheless imported into it. He
agrees with Justice Cardozo that if the statute expresses a relevant safety
judgment and if the defendant has in fact violated it, there is "no dispensing power" in the jury. By his view it is the judge who is exercising
his prerogative, under the guidance of the legislative judgment, to rule on
negligence as a matter of law. It is really, therefore, just a variant on
the issue in the Startup case. Here is a point where I do not happen to
agree with the Traynor policy. I would argue that the per se rule tends
to produce negligence by trap and thus deprives the negligence scheme
of a needed degree of equity. Nevertheless, there is much to admire in
the clarity and sureness with which Justice Traynor states the underlying
theory which makes the statute relevant at all.
It falls to Justice Traynor in Clinkscales v. Carver49 to trace the
per se theory through the perfect test case, a case in which the violation
of the legislative standard would technically be no crime. The defendant
had gone through a stop sign and collided with plaintiff. It appeared that
the ordinance which authorized the placing of stop signs had never become effective criminally because of defects in publication. The defendant, therefore, argued that since there was no effective criminal
standard here, the legislative judgment could not be used at all. Traynor
44

HoLms, THE COmMON LAW 123 (1881).

45 29 Cal. 2d 866, 872, 180 P.2d 896, 899 (1947)

(concurring opinion).
Baltimore & Ohio R-R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); the well-known ill fate is
met in Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
47 29 Cal. 2d 866, 872, 180 P.2d 896, 899 (1947) (concurring opinion).
48 29 Cal. 2d 581, 593, 177 P.2d 279, 286 (1947) (concurring opinion).
49 22 Cal. 2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1957).
46
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rejects the argument firmly and restates, again with admirable clarity,
the basic theory. In the normal case of the criminal statute, the court
does not apply the statute but rather adopts its own specific rule of negligence as a matter of law, guided by the fact of legislative judgment.
Therefore validity of the criminal statute in a criminal prosecution is
irrelevant.
Yet, this enthusiasm for specific standards of care is kept under
control. In Knight v. Kaiser5 0 he restates the California law on attractive
nuisances bringing it under the jurisdiction of general negligence principles. The Knight case involves injury to a child trespassing on defendant's construction site at which there were large piles of sand and gravel
as well as conveyor belts. The ten year old deceased was asphyxiated by
the collapse of a sand pile on which he was playing. The majority affirms
the sustaining of a demurrer to the wrongful death action on the ground
that a common object like a sand pile is not within the attractive nuisance
doctrine, and relies especially on a firm sequence of California precedents
involving bodies of water. Justice Traynor files an effective dissent. He
summarizes ably the anomaly of the "no duty" rules in the area of occupier liability law, and then relying on the Restatement argues that liability,
at least to trespassing children, is to be "determined by applying familiar
negligence standards." The matter is, therefore, not one for rigid,
specific standards of care, and since there are no sand pile precedents as such, in California, the court is free to apply general negligence
principles to the case. When this is done it becomes clear that a large
industrial sand pile carries unreasonable risks to young children.
Finally, there is the care with which, statutes apart, he proceeds
through the calculus of risk embodied in the negligence formula. As examples of this care, in addition to those already noted in Neel, Brandenburg, and Knight, we would add only one last pair of illustrations. In
Richards v. Stanley5 1 he is confronted with judging the conduct of one
who left his car unlocked. The car was stolen, and the thief while driving
negligently injured the plaintiff. Since the statute involved was explicitly
inapplicable to civil suits, the question was one of common law negligence
only. In a vigorous opinion Traynor rules this conduct is not negligence.
The auto might have been lent to the thief without common law negligence; a fortiori he argues there is no negligence if a thief is enabled
to steal it.
A year later in Richardson v. Ham52 he is confronted with an apparently similar situation and rules the other way. Here leaving the vehicle
so that it can be taken by a third party is held to be negligence. The dif5048 Cal. 2d 778, 785, 312 P.2d 1089, 1093 (1957)
5143 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).
5244 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955).

(dissenting opinion).
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ference, of course, is that in Richardson the vehicle in question is not an
auto but a bulldozer. Not only was there evidence of strangers tampering with the bulldozer that should have alerted defendants to the dangers
of leaving it unattended, but the risks involved are radically different:
The risks arising from intermeddling with bulldozers however are
entirely different from those arising from the driving of an automobile
by a thief. Bulldozers are relatively uncommon and curious children or
others attracted by them ordinarily will not know how to operate them.
An intermeddler who starts a bulldozer accidentally or otherwise may
not be able to stop it and the potentialities of harm from a 26-ton bulldozer in uncontrolled motion are enormous, particularly when it is
left on the top of a mesa
from which it can escape and injure persons
53
and property below.
IV
The most interesting tension in the Traynor tort profile is that between
his celebrated products liability cases and a series of other cases involving
business visitors and the like. The business visitor cases would appear
to lay an equal claim to a broad theory of enterprise liability, but Justice
Traynor treats them scrupulously within the confines of a negligence
theory.
For example in Loper v. Morrison5 4 there is the familiar question of
respondeat superior liability. The employee, who used his own car to
collect accounts and solicit new business, deviated from his route somewhat to take a friend home and had the accident in question on the return
trip. The majority would leave the scope of authority issue to the jury.
Traynor dissents sharply. The question is intrinsically a question of law,
and in any event it is clear enough so that it is the court's obligation to
decide it; and to decide that there is no recovery because the employee
of the defendant business enterprise was on a personal errand. Or'in the
Neel case, previously discussed, although the defendant is a restaurant
and the injured plaintiff is a business visitor, Traynor would again as a
matter of law decide against liability. The same result is found in his
opinion in Blumberg v. M. & T. Inc 55 where plaintiff, a business visitor,
falls in the lobby of a downtown hotel belonging to a defendant corporation. The majority would let the issues of negligence and contributory
negligence go to the jury. Again, Traynor in sharp dissent would decide
both issues adversely to the injured plaintiff as a matter of law. In Laird
v. T.W. Mather Inc 55 he upsets a verdict in favor of a 79 year old woman
who was injured by a fall in the basement of defendants' department
store. The case is close on the negligence issues, and Traynor reverses
53 Id. at 776, 285 P.2d at 271.
54 23 Cal. 2d 600, 611, 145 P.2d 1, 6 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
55 34 Cal. 2d 226, 230, 209 P.2d 1, 4 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
50 51 Cal. 2d 210, 331 P.2d 617 (1958).
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for an error in the instruction on the presumption of due care. Then
there is Combs v. Los Angeles Railway Co.57 where, again in dissent,
Traynor would find contributory negligence per se on the part of the
plaintiff who rode on the steps of a street car in violation of a statute.
In each of these cases Traynor has as a matter of law ruled against
an injured plaintiff suing a business enterprise. To be sure, there are
other cases in which he affirms verdicts on behalf of plaintiffs against
business enterprises," but the liability' is always worked out strictly
within the confines of conventional negligence limitations.
We come then at last to the products liability cases where Justice
Traynor's impact on the law of torts has been most noticed. It is a fair
prediction that as the past generation of law students was taught that
the most noted chapter of legal history was the growth of law from
Winterbottom v. Wright' 9 to McPherson v. Buick,6" the next generation
will learn that that is only half the plot and that the line moves on to
.Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co."1 in 1944 and to Greenman v. Yuba
Pqwer Products, Inc. 62 in 1962.
Escola involved an exploding Coca Cola bottle. The plaintiff, a
waitress, was allowed to go to the jury on res ipsa loquitur and recover
-from the Coca Cola company for negligence. Justice Traynor concurred
n the judgment but offered a dramatically different analysis. "Manufacturers' negligence should no longer be singled out as the basis for the
plaintiffs right to recover in cases like the present one.""3 The new policy
considerations are explicitly outlined:,,"Even if there is no negligence,
however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
defective products that reach the market. Those who suffer injury from
defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost
of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured and a needless one for the risk of injury
can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business."6 Moreover, there have been great sociological and technological changes of which the courts must take notice: "As
handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets
and transportation facilities,-the close relationship between producer and
57 29 Cal. 2d 606, 613, 177 P.2d 293, 197 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
58
See, e.g., Burdette v. Rollefson Const. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 720, 344 P.2d 307 (1959);
Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 661, 226 P.2d 574, 578 (1951) (separate opinion); McCordic
v. Crawford, 23 Cal. 2d 1, 142 P.2d 7 (1943).
59 10 M. &.W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
60 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6124 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
6259 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
63 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
64
Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
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consumer of a product had been altered ....The consumer no longer has
means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile
vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build
up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trademarks.", 5
Beyond these large scale policy points he is moved by four other
considerations: (1) in moving these cases to the jury via res ipsa, "the
negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability; ' 6 (2) where a
warranty is available there is already strict liability; (3) it is circuitous
to have plaintiff sue the retailer and the retailer sue the manufacturer;
(4) in the food cases strict liability has long been recognized. These
various lines of argument converge for him on the conclusion that strict
liability is required, and he is Willing as a judge to make the changes in
the law. Finally, as Professor Jaffe noted some years ago,6 7 Justice
Traynor gets no comfort out of the realpolitik of having the change
made surreptitiously by a loose use of res ipsa. He is for candor in judicial law making. "If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods
be responsible for their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason
68
not to fix that responsibility openly."
Justice Traynor returns to the attack in 1949 in Gordon v. Aztec
Brewing Co.69 This time it is a beer bottle that breaks and again res ipsa
loquitur is used to get a jury verdict for the plaintiff. Again Traynor concurs. He argues that on these facts if liability in the case is keyed to
negligence there was prejudicial error in the instructions on res ipsa.
Accordingly, he would save the result by using the strict liability theory
announced in Escola, from which he quotes liberally. There is increased
impatience with an improper use of res ipsa: "If such liability is to be
imposed it should be imposed openly and not by spurious application of
rules developed to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence
70
in negligence cases.1
A decade later in Trust v. Arden Farms Co. 71 it is a milk bottle that
breaks. The Court holds there is no liability either on negligence or
warranty with respect either to the dairy or the bottle manufacturer.
Traynor concurring as to the bottle manufacturer dissents as to the dairy.
Here he would find sufficient elements of a cause of action for breach
65 Id. at 467, 150
66 Id. at 463, 150
67 Jaffe, Res Ipsa
68
Escola v. Coca
(concurring opinion).
69 33 Cal. 2d 514,
70 Id. at 530, 203
71 50 Cal. 2d 217,

P.2d at 443.
P.2d at 441.
Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BuF'FAo L. Rav. 1, 13 (1951).
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
523, 203 P.2d 522, 528 (1949) (concurring opinion).
P.2d at 532.
235, 324 P.2d 583, 594 (1958) (separate opinion).
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of'warranty. Nevertheless, he returns once again to his Escola theme.
Protection of the consumer should not depend "on the intricacies of the
law of sales. Liability should not be determined mechanically by fortuitous circumstances." 72 Furthermore, in this case the strict liability in
food cases offers a compelling analogy. "Whatever the arguments for
limiting the manufacturer's strict liability to food stuffs, there is no
rational basis for differentiating between food stuffs and their containers."7
In Yuba Power the story reaches its climax-for the moment.74 The
notable circumstance is that now Justice Traynor has won his fight and
writes his strict liability theory in an opinion for a unanimous court. The
exact posture of issues in the case is complicated. Plaintiff is injured by a
.defect in a power tool and sues both the retailer and the manufacturer.
There is evidence of negligence and the jury is instructed on both negligence and warranty theories as the manufacturer's brochure had contained warranties and had been directed at the consumer. The jury brings
in a verdict against the manufacturer alone. The main point of the appeal
is that plaintiff failed to comply with the provisions of the Sales Act for
,giving notice in cases of breach of warranty. Hence there could be no
recovery on warranty grounds. Since the jury had returned a general
verdict, a verdict possibly based on negligence must also be set aside.
We have then a case where there is evidence of negligence on the part
of the manufacturer and a jury verdict for the consumer but where the
overlap with warranty theory endangers the verdict.
In this impasse Traynor comes to the rescue with his strict liability
theory. He finds it scarcely necessary to "recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liability on the manufacturers. 7 5 We are reminded that
"the purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves."" The more arresting point is the translation into pure tort terms of the kind of warranty talk that has been
used to impose strict liability on the manufacturer. In a splendid paragraph indicative of his characteristic ability to go beyond verbal symbols,
he points out that whatever the idiom used, the warranty in these cases
-has no resemblance to that in sales and that therefore any notice provisions of the Sales Act are irrelevant. That the new liability is imposed
by law irrespective of agreement and that the warrantor cannot limit his
72

1d. at 236, 324 P.2d at 294-95.

73Id. at 237, 324 P.2d at 295.

74 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
75 Ibid.
'76 Ibid.
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liability "make clear that the liability is not governed by the law of
contract but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs
of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern the
manufacturers liability to those injured by their defective products unless
77
such rules serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed.
The performance is impressive. By his steady advocacy, over two
decades, of a change Justice Traynor has been able in the end to carry
the whole court with him. In so doing he has affected not only the law
of California but by prestigeful example, the law of the United States.
The tension, however, between the two lines of liability theory remains
arresting. It is easy to ask why the person who falls in a department
store or who is hit by a street car is any better equipped in general to
withstand the loss of accident than the consumer; or again to ask why the
business enterprises are any less able to insure and distribute the costs
to a wide public, than is the manufacturer. Can the consumer be singled
out for special liability protection, or by so doing do we open up the
entire tort field to radical revision? Justice Traynor is too candid and
too responsible a judge to engage in the strategy of law reform by using
the tactic of the foot in the door. Therefore, what commands our attention is why he perceived the two situations as so different. In so doing
he has posed for the tort world an issue of interest and importance which
is likely to be the topic of excited and exciting controversy for the foreseeable future.
Several lines of distinction suggest themselves. First, he sees the products liability field as set apart by its special history-there is the overlap with warranty, there is the expansive use of res ipsa, there is the
circuity of suits against the retailer who then sues the manufacturer, and
there is the strong analogy of the food products liability cases. None of
these factors are present when, say, a man falls on the stairs in a department store. Second, there is a point about wide loss distribution in this
context which he has not yet made explicit. The economist would tell us
that if we put liability strictly on the manufacturer we are in effect com77
There is one later "post-Yuba" Traynor decision that carries farther his obliteration
of warranty concepts in his new products liability tort, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
61 A.C. 245, 391, P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964). Chief Justice Traynor in a case of
a defective automobile, highly reminiscent on its facts of McPherson, not only repeats his
YIba rule of strict liability in tort for the manufacturer, but also makes clear that it applies equally to the retailer and that it renders inoperative in tort any disclaimer between
retailer and purchaser. As to the retailer's strict liability he observes: "Strict liability on
the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff
and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection
between them in the course of their continuing business relationship." And as to the dis-

claimer, he notes simply: "Since Maywood Bell is strictly liable in tort, the fact that it
restricted its contractual liability to Vandermark is immaterial."
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pelling the consumer through increased prices to buy accident insurance
for himself., Perhaps in the great overlap between the consumer public
onto whom the cost of protection is to be passed and the consumer who
is to be given the protection of strict liability, there is the basis for a
distinctive products liability rationale.78 Third, and closest to what Chief
Justice Traynor himself has told us, there is a difference in the capacity
of the injured party to protect himself from harm. What impressed him
in Neel for example was that the defect in the stairway was so obvious
that it carried a fair warning. What impresses him in Escola and Yuba
Power is that the .consumer can no longer detect defects in the goods he
buys. There is the germ of a large idea here. Perhaps negligence is suited
only for cases where there is some parity of risk avoiding ability between actor and victim, where, so to speak, risk avoidance is shared
between them.", When, however, the victim can do nothing to protect
himself, and this is the Traynor view of the consumer, then strict liability
is called for.
One final observation about the tension may be in order. Chief Justice
Traynor in his products liability cases may be said to be using the large
premises of a public law approach to*liability, viewing it is an arrangement for~exploiting insurance principles. What makes his performance
uniquely interesting is his desire to use the premises as a common law
judge, to use themii, that is) with the distinctions appropriate to a common
law map. It remains"to be seen whether this mixture of approaches to
liability will prove feasible in the end."0
At' the outset I said that Roger Traynor was a law professor's judge.
This was meant as real and not faint praise. He has respect for his task.
He sees law as a body of, knowledge, ideally as a structured system of
norms rationally ordered. With his every decision he brings the law a
little closer to this ideal. In his judging in torts he shows a striking combination of conservatism and creativity. Because of both of these tendencies not 'only the tort law of California but the tort law of the United
States has been all the better for his -twenty-five years of service on the
bench.
78 See Blum & Kalven, supra note 26, at 692-703. But the economist also suggests
that it makes less difference than the law has suspected where the loss is left in cases like
this.
79 There is a haunting analogy between this division of the accident universe and that

suggested by Blackburn, J. in Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Exch. 265, 287-7 (1866), where
he explained that negligence was the appropriate principle for traffic accidents "upon land
or sea" but an inappropriate principle for 'accidents' between adjoining landowners. Although he couched the difference in terms of a famous dictum about assumption of risk,
he and Chief justice Traynor may be sharing the same basic perception.
80
Blum & Kalven, op. cit. supra note 26.
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